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We  present  a  model  of  growth  driven  by  energy  use  and  endogenous  factor-
augmenting  technological  change.  Both  the  rate  and  direction  of  technological 
progress are endogenous. The model captures four main stylized facts: total energy 
use has increased; energy use per hour worked increased slightly; energy efficiency 
has improved; and the value share of energy in GDP has steadily fallen. We study 
how energy conservation policies affect growth over time and the long run. Policies 
that reduce the level of energy use are distinguished from those that reduce the growth 
rate  of  energy  inputs.  Although  these  policies  may  stimulate  innovation,  they 
unambiguously depress output levels. The former policy has no impact on long-run 
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 1. Introduction  
 
Central to the economic analysis of climate change policies are the interactions among 
energy use, technological change and economic growth. The stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations requires reductions in fossil fuel energy use, which is a 
major essential input throughout all modern economies. Cuts in energy use are likely 
to seriously affect GDP and economic growth. However, if energy conservation can 
be realised through new energy efficient technologies, the trade-off between energy 
reduction and growth becomes less severe.  
Economists have increasingly stressed the crucial role of technical change in 
the context of climate change, environmental and energy policy (see Loeschel, 2002, 
for a survey). It is found that the cost of such policies crucially depends on how fast 
energy efficiency improves. Technical change should be viewed as an endogenous 
variable: either directly or through changing energy prices, policies may induce 
innovation by providing incentives to allocate more resources to the development of 
energy-saving technologies. Climate policy assessments based on the conventional 
assumption of autonomous energy efficiency improvements ignore these effects. This 
is why recent studies stress evidence of induced technical change (see Jaffe et al., 
2000), focus on learning effects associated with abatement activities and clean 
technology, and turn to (mostly ad-hoc) modelling of induced technical change (see 
the survey by Azar and Dowlatabadi, 1999).  
To enhance our understanding of how environmental and energy policies 
induce technical change, and how they affect economic growth, we need a general-
equilibrium analysis of the allocation of research and development activities in the 
total economy. Policy may not only affect innovation related to energy and clean 
technologies, but may also crowd out other innovation projects when changing the 
direction of technical change. We need to know how policy affects the direction of 
innovation as well as the aggregate rate of innovation. The interaction between these 
two is neglected in most of the literature so far.  
  The aim of this paper is to develop a growth model in which energy is an 
essential input and endogenous technical change drives long-run growth. We require 
that this model is consistent with the main stylised facts concerning energy use and 
growth. We model innovation as rational investment behaviour driven by profit 
maximization. We build the model in order to find analytical results concerning the   3 
effects of a reduction in energy use (“energy conservation”) on the rate and direction 
of technical change, and on GDP and growth over time.  
For our purposes, the model has to be consistent with at least four stylised 
facts. Jones (2002, based on EIA 1999) summarizes these for the US over the period 
1950-1998. First, energy efficiency (GDP per unit of energy input) has improved at an 
annual rate of 1.4 per cent on average. Second, per capita energy use has increased at 
an average annual rate of about 1 percent. Third, the share of energy cost in GDP has 
declined at an average annual rate of about 1 percent. Fourth, energy prices per unit of 
labour cost have declined (see also Nordhaus, 1992; Simon, 1996). Needless to say, 
the trends for the period 1971-1980 are markedly different, with even faster 
improvements in the energy efficiency, falling per capita energy inputs, and a sharply 
rising energy cost share (from 2 percent in 1970 to 7 percent in 1980). In Table 1 and 
Figures 1 and 2, we present figures based on own calculations for the US, Japan, and 
three large European economies.
1 The trends after 1969 are similar to those of the US.  
 
*** insert about here: Table 1, Figures 1 and 2 *** 
 
In our model, per capita energy evolves exogenously and ongoing technical 
change explains the steady decline in energy intensity, energy share, and price of 
energy relative to wages. Labour and energy inputs enter the production function 
symmetrically as gross complements. Energy and labour are each combined with 
specific complementary intermediate inputs, to be interpreted as capital. Monopolistic 
firms supply these intermediate goods and have the opportunity to invest in improved 
quality of the goods. In the transition to the steady state, the effective supply of 
energy, corrected for these quality improvements, grows faster than the effective 
supply of labour, which results in a gradual decline in the share of energy.  
We study the effects of energy conservation by exogenously reducing either 
the level or the growth rate of energy inputs in the model. Energy becomes scarcer 
and producers are willing to pay higher prices for energy services. The returns to 
                                                 
1 We used data from the International Sectoral Database (OECD, 1999), and the OECD energy 
balances. Following the approach outlined in De Nooij et al. (2001), we used the sectoral data to 
include the transformation losses and the deliveries of the electricity sector to other sectors in the 
macro-economic energy use. From the Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston, 1991, mark 5.6) we 
used the data on population (1), real GDP per capita in constant dollars (3), real GDP per worker 1985 
intl. prices (19) and non-residential capital stock per worker in 1985 intl. prices (20; numbers refer to 
the ordering in Summers and Heston).   4 
investment in quality improvements of energy-related intermediates rise relatively to 
labour-related innovations. This spurs energy-related innovation, possibly at the cost 
of labour-related innovation. In the new equilibrium the direction of innovation has 
shifted to energy and rates of return are equalised over the two types of innovation 
projects. If this new common rate of return has increased, the aggregate rate of 
innovation is stimulated as well. We show that this may happen if innovators in 
energy-related sectors are better able to appropriate the social returns to innovation 
than those in other sectors.  
We find that energy conservation reduces output levels both in the short and 
long run. These lower levels are typically associated with higher short-run per capita 
growth rates. Long-run growth rates are not affected by a permanent change in the 
level of energy input, but fall if the growth rate of energy inputs is permanently 
reduced. Induced technical change may result in smaller drops in output than when 
technological change is exogenous. 
  Our analysis is related to the literature on environmental policy and 
technology (Goulder and Mathai, 2000), and the literature on the environment and 
growth (Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995; Smulders, 2000). While the former typically 
concentrates on how environmental policy induces technological change and learning 
in particular directions or sectors in a partial analysis, the latter takes a general-
equilibrium perspective with only one type of research. Goulder and Schneider (1999) 
and Buonanno et al. (2001) combine the two approaches in a calibrated model in 
which perfect competition prevails in all markets. We aim at integrating the induced 
technology and growth perspective, without giving up the analytical tractability and 
micro foundations of the endogenous growth models.  
Our model builds on growth theory. Neoclassical resource-and-growth models 
assume exogenous technology but concentrate on endogenous depletion of non-
renewable resources (see the surveys by Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Withagen, 1991). 
We complement this approach by focusing on endogenous technology, with 
exogenous energy supply.
2 Other models of endogenous growth and energy use have 
                                                 
2 Edenhofer (2000) allows for both endogenous extraction and endogenous direction of technical 
change in a central planner setting. Note that it would not suffice in our model to follow the standard 
modeling of non-renewable resource extraction with a given stock and constant extraction costs, since 
this would – contrary to the stylized facts – produce an ever-falling supply of energy. Note that in our 
simplification we admittedly sacrifice some completeness, but we also gain in terms of generality of 
the model, since the energy variable can now be broadly interpreted as a resource variable, e.g. a 
polluting input or a renewable resource variable.   5 
focussed on a single type of innovation and Cobb-Douglas production functions 
(Aghion and Howitt, 1998, Chapter 5; Grimaud and Rougé, 2001; Van Zon and 
Yetkiner, 2001). We complement this literature by allowing for both labour-
augmenting and energy-augmenting technological change, and elasticities of 
substitution below unity (that is, labour and energy are gross complements). 
3 
Our modelling of production and innovation partly follows Acemoglu (1998, 
2001) and Kiley (1999), who develop a framework to analyse the forces that shape the 
direction of technical change towards particular factors of production. We are 
interested in whether a change in the direction of technical change may accelerate 
aggregate growth, rather than in explaining the direction itself. We therefore explicitly 
relate forces that direct technological change to forces that shape the overall 
productivity of innovation. Our model deviates from Acemoglu’s model in some 
important respects. First, innovation is undertaken in-house in our model (in the spirit 
of Smulders and Van de Klundert, 1995), while Acemoglu’s model relies on creative 
destruction (as in Aghion and Howitt, 1992) and Kiley’s model relies on labour 
division and variety expanding (as in Romer, 1990). In this respect, our approach is 
complementary to Kiley and Acemoglu by studying a third mode of R&D driven 
economic growth. Second, while in Acemoglu (1998, 2001) and Kiley (1999) the 
relative supply of primary factors is stationary, we allow for steady increases in the 
supply of energy relative to labour supply. Third, we stress that technological change 
may be biased because of differences in appropriability conditions for different 
investment projects (cf. Nahuis and Smulders, 2002).  
  Our analysis is divided in three stages to clearly disentangle the effects of (i) 
the presence of technical change per se, (ii) the endogeneity of the bias of technology 
(induced technical change), and (iii) the endogeneity of the rate of technical change. 
In section 2, we consider the production side of the economy and take technology as 
exogenous. We illustrate how exogenous reductions in energy use affect the aggregate 
growth rate for given technological change. In section 3 we introduce induced 
technological change by modelling how firms change the type of innovation projects 
if energy supply changes and the total research budget is held constant. In section 4, 
the total amount of innovation in the economy may respond to rates of return to 
innovation. Section 5 concludes.  
                                                 
3 Most of the older theoretical literature has used this assumption (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). It implies   6 
 
 
2. Production with Energy, Labour and Factor-specific Capital and Technology 
 
2.1. Modelling production 
We consider a closed economy that produces a single final consumption good. Inputs 
in the production process are labour, energy (or more general, natural resources) and 
intermediates (“capital”).
4 The latter are produced according to the same production 
technology as final goods. Hence labour and resources, denoted by L and R 
respectively, are the primary (non-reproducible) inputs. Since we are focusing on the 
role of energy in growth of production rather than on its supply, we assume that 
energy supply is exogenous. In particular, we allow for a constant rate of growth of 
both energy and labour inputs.  
  The key feature of the production structure, borrowed from Acemoglu (1998), 
is that the productivity of labour (energy) mainly depends on the quantity and quality 
of intermediate goods that are complementary to labour (energy). Final goods 
producers optimally choose quantities, while the quality is a predetermined variable. 
This section derives how aggregate output can be expressed in terms of exogenous 
factor inputs and predetermined quality (technology) levels.   
 
Final goods production  
Final goods producers use labour services (YL) and energy (resource) services (YR) to 
produce final goods (Y). The two inputs are imperfect substitutes, the elasticity of 
substitution is denoted by s, which we assume to be smaller than unity. The price of 
the final good is normalized to one and the (internal accounting) prices of labour and 
energy services are denoted pYL and pYR, respectively. Using a CES specification, we 
may write: 
 
  ( )
/( 1) ( 1)/ ( 1)/
L R Y A Y Y
- - - = × +
s s s s s s     (1) 
                                                                                                                                           
that both inputs are essential and necessary. Empirical evidence is inconclusive (cf. Neumaier, 1999). 
4 Note that we simplify by modelling capital inputs as a flow variable. To avoid confusion we 
label them intermediate inputs.  
   7 
 
/ ( / )
s - = L R YL YR Y Y p p   (2) 
 
1 1 1 1/(1 ) 1 [ ] YL YR A p p
- -s -s -s = +   (3) 
 
Equation (2) represents relative demand. Equation (3) reflects our choice of the 
numeraire. Labour (energy) services are derived from combining raw labour (energy) 
inputs and a range of specialized intermediate inputs x, each of which is available at a 
certain quality q. In particular, we assume that services of type i = L,R are produced 





b b - = ò i i ik ik Y S q x dk   (4) 
 
where Si is the use (or – in equilibrium – the Supply) of raw input i (i.e. SL=L and 
SR=R), xik is the use of intermediates of variant k in the production of type i services, 
and qik is the associated quality level. The number of intermediates in each sector is 
normalized to unity. Note that intermediates x are input-specific. Thus, the 
productivity of energy services is determined by the quality and supply of the 
available intermediates specially developed for energy services. This allows us to 
model input-specific technical change. 
The production possibilities defined by (1) and (4) can be written in terms of 















  (5) 
 
so that, after substitution in (4), we may write Yi = AiSi for production services, and, 
after substitution in (1),  
 
  ( )
/( 1) ( 1)/ ( 1)/ ( ) ( ) L R Y A A L A R
- - - = +
s s s s s s   (6)   8 
 
for total final output. Equation (6) is the conventional macroeconomic production 
function with factor augmentation, but in this model the factor augmentation (or 
technology) levels Ai are endogenous: according to (5) they depend on quality of 
intermediate inputs, as well as on quantity of these inputs per unit of raw factor input.  
 Final-goods producers maximize profits, taking prices as given. They demand 
labour, energy and intermediates up to the point where marginal productivity of these 







Yi i Yi i i
i
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  (7) 
  (1 ) ( / )
b b
¶
= Û - =
¶
i
Yi xik Yi ik i ik xik
ik
Y
p p p q S x p
x
  (8) 
 
where wi is the factor price for raw inputs, and pxik is the price of intermediate good 
xik. Equation (8) reveals that the elasticity of demand for each intermediate good 
equals 1/b. 
 
Intermediate goods production and price setting 
Each intermediate good producer supplies a unique variety and sets a monopoly price. 
(Each also invests in quality improvement, but we postpone this to the next section). 
Their market is thus characterized by monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz, 
1977).  
  The cost of producing one unit of xik at quality qik is qik units of the final good. 
Maximizing profits subject to the demand for the intermediate good given above, we 
find the monopoly price: 
 
  /(1 ) b = - xik ik p q   (9) 
 
According to this equation, prices are set as a mark-up over unit costs (q). As usual, 
the mark-up is negatively related to the elasticity of demand 1/b. 
  Substituting the price in the demand function, we find that all intermediate 
goods producers within the same sector i produce the same level of output xi:   9 
 
  ( )
1/ 2 (1 )
b
b - º = Yi i i ik p S x x .  (10) 
 
Static goods market equilibrium 
We now substitute equilibrium quantities of intermediate inputs from (10) into the 
production and demand functions in order to express key variables in terms of 
primary inputs (R and L) and technology variables. It turns out that the level of 
technology is most easily captured by average quality of labour-related and energy-





=ò i ik Q q dk ,             i = R,L.  (11) 
 
  To summarize static goods market equilibrium, we first solving for relative 
prices, relative supply of intermediates, and other relative variables:
5  
 




Y p Q R L
-b n
=   (12) 
  ( ) ( )
1/ (1 )/ /
B B x Q R L
- n - -n n =   (13) 
  ( ) ( )
(1 )/ 1/ /
B B w Q R L
- -n n - n =   (14) 
 
where  1 (1 ) n = -b -s . The superscript B denotes ratios of energy to labour variables, 
e.g. pY
B º pYR/pYL, w
B º wR/wL. This B-superscript stands for “bias”, e.g. Q
B º QR/QL  
represents the bias in technology.   
  We next solve for aggregate variables. Combining (1), (3), (4), (10), and (12), 
we rewrite the production function as:
6  
 
  ( )
/( 1) ( 1)/ ( 1)/ ( ) ( ) L R Y Q L Q R
- - - = +
n n n n n n   (15) 
                                                 
5 From (4) and (5) we find Y
B=A
BS
B. Combining (5) and (10), we find 
(1 )/ ( )
B B B
Y A Q p
- =
b b . When we 
use this expression to eliminate A
B and (2) to eliminate Y





1/b. Using (12) to eliminate p
B, we find (13). Finally, we find (14) from (7) and (12).   10 
 
This equation represents the production function for equilibrium levels of capital 
inputs (xi). The quality indices Qi now act as factor augmentation levels. The elasticity 
of substitution between effective labour input ( L Q L) and effective energy input ( R Q R) 
is 0 (1 ) 1 < n = -b +bs < , which is a weighted average of the elasticity of substitution 
between energy and labour services (s, see (1)) and the elasticity of substitution 
between primary inputs and capital inputs (which equals 1, see (4)).  




/(1 ) / (1 ) L R Y L Q
n -n = -q   (16) 
  / ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )
B
L R R L g Y L Q g Q º - = +q +   (17) 
 
where  / ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )
B





1 (1 )/ 1 ( / ) 1
B
R L Q R L
- -n n é ù q = -q = + ë û   (18) 
 
Important to note from (14) and (18) is that for poor substitution ( 1 n < ) an increase in 
the bias of technology Q
B implies a fall in energy prices and in the energy share. An 
increase in Q
B therefore has the interpretation of energy-saving (or labour-biased) 
technical change. Hence, equation (17) shows three sources of growth (cf growth 
accounting): growing per capita energy inputs, labour-related technical change and 
energy-saving technical change.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
6 We have chosen units of Y in (1) such that 
2( 1)/ (1 ) A
b- b = -b , so that the scale constant in (15) 
becomes unity. 
7 These shares include expenditures on factor-specific intermediates (“capital”). Note from (4) that the 
share of intermediates in total output equals 1-b , so that we have to multiply the expressions in (18) 
by the constant b to find the share of energy and labour cost in total output:  / R R w R Y bq =  and 
/ L L w L Y bq = . In the rest of the text we will focus on  R q and simply refer to it as the energy share.    11 
2.2. Energy conservation with exogenous technological change 
Before we study the full model, we derive a set of results for the case of exogenous 
technological change. In the next sections, we make a comparison with the case of 
endogenous technology.  
  Suppose the supply of primary inputs (R and L) as well as technology 
variables (QR and QL) evolve exogenously over time. To make the model consistent 
with the stylised facts we assume that (i)  ˆ 0 L Q > , (ii)  / 0 R L g > , which means that 
energy per capita steadily increases, and (iii)  / ˆ 0
B
R L g Q + >  but may approach zero 
(or become zero at t > T), so that relative effective energy inputs steadily grow and the 
cost share of energy steadily falls (until time T), see (18). The implication of this 
calibration is that the energy cost share falls to zero in the long run (or to a constant 
value at time T), and that long-run per capita income growth is driven by growth in 
the quality of labour inputs QL only, see (17). Since effective per capita energy use 
grows and substitution is poor ( 1 n < ), effective labour input is the scarce production 
factor, which drives growth in the long run. 
  What is effect of energy conservation on output and growth? Policies that 
imply induce lower levels of energy use, without affecting the exogenous levels of 
labour and technology (L, QL, QR), unambiguously result in lower levels of (per 
capita) income, see (15). They also drive up energy prices and the energy cost share in 
production ( R q , see (18)). However, lower income levels may go together with higher 
rates of economic growth (faster convergence to the steady state). On the one hand, 
(17) reveals that a lower level of energy use (R) affects growth positively through a 
higher energy share  R q . The reason is that when energy is less abundant, its marginal 
product is higher so that a given growth rate of energy use has a larger effect on 
income. We label this the “neoclassical scarcity effect”. On the other hand, when 
energy conservation policies take the form of a lower growth rate of energy use, 
/ R L g , they negatively affect growth in (16) by reducing one of the three sources of 
growth in the growth-accounting sense. We label this the “source-of-growth effect”. 
  In the long run, energy conservation policies cannot affect growth. If 
/ ˆ 0
B
R L g Q + >  continues to hold in the long run, the energy share approaches zero 
( 0 R q = ). The energy share becomes a constant if  / ˆ 0
B
R L g Q + =  in the long run. In   12 
both cases the growth rate approaches  ˆ
L g Q = . In the long run, energy is not a scarce 
factor, its role in production becomes negligible, and exogenous technological change 
entirely drives growth (as in the standard Solow growth model). The results therefore 
crucially hinge on the assumption of exogenous technical change, which will be 
relaxed in the next sections.  
 
3. Induced technical change 
 
3.1. Modelling technical change 
We now introduce induced technological change by assuming that each intermediate 
goods producer improves the quality of her good by investing in in-house research 





ik i i i ik q Q D D
-w w = x  ,  (19) 
 
where Dik is resources spent on development by the firm. Apart from the scaling 
parameterx, the productivity in development activities depends on two types of 
spillovers.  
  First, an individual firm builds on the knowledge accumulated in the past by 
all firms in the sector (see Popp (2002) for evidence with respect to energy-related 
research). This knowledge stock is proxied by the current aggregate quality level Qi. 
The firm takes it as given and neglects its own current development efforts expand the 
knowledge stock on which future development builds. Thus, intertemporal spillovers 
arise, which play an important role in preventing the returns to innovation to fall over 
time. Since production costs rise with the quality level of the product, the return on 
subsequent innovation tends to fall. However, intertemporal spillovers reduce the cost 
of innovation, which boosts the rate of return. Under the present specification, both 
forces exactly offset each other in the long run and rates of return can be sustained. 
  Second, quality development efforts become more productive when other 
firms are more active. This instantaneous intrasectoral research spillover is captured 
by parameter 1–w. Whereas 1-w reflects the returns to innovation that leak to other 
firms, its complement w reflects the share of returns to innovation that accrue to the 
inventing firm. We therefore label w as the appropriability parameter. A higher value   13 
implies that innovators can better appropriate the returns to R&D, which increases the 
marginal incentives to innovate.  
   Firms choose innovation efforts Dik so as to maximize the net present value of 
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  (20) 
 
where r is the interest rate, wD is the cost of development D, and hats denote growth 
rates. The equation states that the firm invests until the marginal returns from 
investment (rik) equal the cost of capital r. The first term on the right-hand side is the 
direct return from higher quality. Profits rise with quality in proportion to its sales xi. 
The other terms equal the expected rate of change in the shadow price of quality 
improvements. Fast quality growth in the economy (captured by  ˆ Q) implies large 
spillovers and cheaper development in the future, which provides an incentive to 
postpone innovation, that is, they reduce the current rate of return. A higher future 
cost of development (which is anticipated if  ˆ 0 D w > ) has an opposite effect.  
    All firms active in development should earn the same marginal return. 
Equation (20) shows that this requires Dik = Di, that is, all firms within a sector 
choose the same level of development efforts. Moreover, the marginal return across 
the sectors is equalized (rRk = rLk = r). After substituting 
2 (1 ) i i i xQ Y = q -b , which 
follows from (4), (10) and the definition  / i Yi i p Y Y q = , we may write (20) as:  
 
  ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) (1 ) D L L L L R R R R
D D
Y Y
r w Q Q
w w
æ ö æ ö
- =b -b w x q - =b -b w x q - ç ÷ ç ÷
è ø è ø
  (21) 
 
where the second equality implies (note  ˆ ˆ ˆ B
R L Q Q Q = - ): 
 




b -b w x q -w x q  
   14 
This differential equation reveals how the bias in technical change,  ˆ B Q , is affected by 
profit incentives. Technological change leads in the sector with highest  i i i wx q , which 
identifies three incentives for biased technological change: large markets (as 
measured by the value share q), high average productivity of research (x), and high 
appropriability of research investments (w). Noting from (18) that  1 L R q = -q , we 
may simplify the equation as:  
 




  (1 )( / )( ) BTC D L L R R Y w l ºb -b w x +w x  
  /( ) NB L L L L R R q º w x w x +w x  
 
There is no bias in technology by construction if  R NB q = q , which implies that the 
share of energy in GDP is high enough to offset relatively low research productivity 
and/or appropriability in energy-related technology. For higher energy shares, 
innovation becomes biased to energy. The adjustment speed parameter  BTC l  
determines how strongly biased technical change responses to these increases in the 
market for energy technology: it captures aggregate appropriability and productivity 
conditions.  
  Since (18) implies that the change in the energy share  R q  depends on the 
change in Q
B and the exogenous change in R/L, we can combine (18) and (22) to find 
the following differential equation for the energy share: 
 
  [ ] /
1 ˆ (1 ) ( ) R R BTC R NB R L g
-n æ ö q = - -q l q -q + ç ÷ n è ø
  (23) 
 
3.2. Energy conservation and growth with constant aggregate research  
The building blocks of the model that are presented so far are sufficient to study the 
effect of endogenous changes in the direction of technical change in isolation from 
the effects of changes in the rate of innovation. Before we add the remaining building   15 
blocks of the general-equilibrium version of the model, we assume as an intermediate 
step in the analysis that wages for researchers grow at the same rate as output so that 
Y/wD is constant over time and that the total number of researchers is constant and 
equal to D, so that  L R D D D + =  (in the next section we will see that these 
assumptions hold along a balanced growth path). In the resulting partial-equilibrium 
variant of the model, income growth is driven by exogenous growth in per capita 
energy use and by technological change of which the composition (direction or bias) 
is endogenous. We investigate in turn the following three questions: what are the 
dynamics of technology and growth if this partial model is calibrated to the stylised 
facts, how do energy conservation policies affect growth, and how does the presence 
of induced technical change affect the results compared to case with exogenous 
technology?  
 
Technology and growth dynamics 
We now show that, consistent with the stylised facts summarised in the introduction, 
the share of energy in national income, energy intensity, and energy prices relative to 
wages all steadily fall, if the total research effort (D) is assumed to be sufficiently 
large and  / R L Q R Q L is sufficiently small initially. With this calibration, the per capita 
growth rate falls over time, but may rise near the steady state. 
  The dynamics are represented by (23), which is a stable differential equation 
in one variable only, viz.  R q . In the long run, the energy cost share approaches the 
following value: 
 
  / ( ) / R NB R L BTC g q ¥ = q - l   (24) 
 
where the ¥-index is used to denote long-run values. Note that the initial value of the 
energy share is given, since  /
B Q R L in (18) is predetermined.  If the economy starts 
at an energy share above the value in (24), it falls over time according to (23).
8  
  The associated technology dynamics are represented by (22). Technological 
change is energy-saving when the energy share is still high (Q
B increases, see (22)), 
                                                 
8 To rule out corner solutions, we assume that the expression at the right hand side of (24) is a value 
between 0 and 1, which requires a sufficiently small  / R L g .    16 
but becomes energy-using for a small enough energy share. In the long run, there is 
energy-using (labour-biased) technical change if per capita energy supply steadily 
grows: 
 
  / ˆ ( )
B
R L Q g ¥ = -   (25) 
 
Initially, energy (measured in effective units) is relatively scarce, which induces firms 
to invest mainly in energy-related technological change. Together with the increase in 
energy supply this makes energy less scarce over time and causes the energy share to 
fall. However as energy becomes less scarce, innovation in labour-related technology 
becomes relatively more attractive. The composition of research gradually shifts away 
from energy and the decline of the energy share comes to a halt. 
  Energy prices per unit of labour cost ( /
B
R L w w w º ), which have declined 
according to the data, also fall according to the model, both during transition and in 
the long run, since (14) and (18) imply  / ˆ ˆ /(1 ) 0
B
R R R L w g = q -q - < . 
  To analyse the rate of technological change, we use the fact that all firms in a 
sector choose the same amount of research. As a result, average product quality grows 
at the same rate as firm-level product quality and (19) can be written as  ˆ
i i i Q D = x . 
Together with the total research constraint  L R D D D + =  and the definition 
/
B
R L Q Q Q º , we may write: 
 







,   (26)   
 
where  /( ) R L R L z º x x x +x .  
  To find the total effect of induced technical change on growth, we substitute 
(22) and (26) into (17), which gives the growth rate as a quadratic function of the 
energy share. We plot this relationship in Figure 3. Since the energy share falls over 
time and approaches to the value denoted by  ( ) R q ¥ , we move to the left along the 
curve. The growth rate falls over time for large values of the energy share, but starts 
to rise once  [ ( ) /( )]/2 R R L L R q < q ¥ +x x +x . The figure is drawn for   17 
/ / (1 )( / ) L R R L D g Y w w -w < zb -b , which ensures that  ( ) /( ) R L L R q ¥ < x x +x . If  L w  
exceeds  R w  so much that the last two inequalities are reversed, which holds if 
 
  / / (1 )( / ) L R R L D g Y w w > w + zb -b ,  (27) 
the growth rate monotonically declines during transition. Note that (27) is the 
condition under which, when starting from a steady state, a marginal increase in the 
energy share increases growth. 
 
***insert figure about here *** 
Figure 3 Partial-equilibrium dynamics of the energy share and output growth with 
induced technical change 
 
  The growth rate tends to fall during transition. As long as the energy share is 
above its steady state value, energy-related innovation projects (investment in QR) 
have a high pay-off and research effort can be allocated to high-return projects. 
However, as energy-technologies have improved further and further, energy becomes 
effectively less and less scarce, the returns to further energy-efficiency improvements 
fall and research has to be reallocated to lower-return projects, viz. labour-related 
innovation. With this fall in returns to research effort, growth falls. This downward 
trend in growth may be reversed if the energy share is close to its steady state value 
and appropriability in labour-related innovation is relatively poor ( L w  small so that 
(27) is violated). Then the extent of underinvestment because of appropriability 
problems is highest in labour-related innovation. The gradual shift to labour-related 
innovation, which occurs when energy becomes less scarce, stimulates innovation in 
sectors with high economy-wide rate of return and thus boosts growth.  
  Finally, we consider the dynamics of energy intensity, or its inverse, energy 
efficiency (Y/R). Since we may write  / ˆ ˆ
R L Y R g g - = - , energy efficiency improves (as 
consistent with the stylized facts) if the growth rate g is high relative to per capita 
energy growth. From (17) and (26), we see that this requires D to be sufficiently large. 
Hence with sufficient research effort, technical change endogenously creates energy 
efficiency improvements.  
    18 
Energy conservation and growth  
We can now investigate how energy-conservation policy affects growth through the 
channel of induced technical change. The policy affects the bias of technical change 
only through changes in the energy share (see (22)). Lower levels of energy use 
increase the energy share and stimulate energy-saving technical change. Growth 
increases if the energy share is high enough at the time of the policy, see figure 3. If 
(27) is satisfied, the growth rate increases for all energy shares above the steady state 
level.  
  What happens to long-run growth? Substituting (25) and (26) into (17), we 
find: 
 






¥ = + z ¥ ç ÷ x + x è ø
  (28) 
 
This expression reveals that (since we fixed D) long-run growth is not affected by 
energy conservation policies if these reduce the level of energy use. Long-run growth 
is negatively affected by energy conservation policies if these reduce the growth rate 
of energy use. Note that this is the sources-of-growth effect identified in section 2.  
  What happens to output levels? Initially, lower energy use unambiguously 
results in lower output, since technology variables are predetermined. Even if the 
policy induces higher growth rates, long-run output levels are unambiguously lowered 
by energy conservation policies. This claim can be proven as follows. From (18) and 
(23), we see that  R q  is higher with energy conservation for all t. This implies that  ˆ B Q  
is higher, see (22), and that  ˆ
L Q  is lower, see (26). As a result, the level  L Q  must be 
lower. With higher  R q  and lower  L Q , Y/L is lower, see (16). 
 
Induced technology and exogenous technology compared 
Although energy conservation policies reduce output, they may do so less than in the 
case of exogenous technical change. To illustrate this, we first calibrate both the 
exogenous technology model and the induced technology model to the same steady 
state, then marginally reduce energy inputs, and compare long-run output levels in 
both models.    19 
First, for any set of parameters, we can construct a steady state (balanced 
growth path) for the model variant with induced technology (this section) by choosing 
an initial value for the energy share that exactly equals the one in (24). The same 
balanced growth path can be constructed for the same set of parameters in the model 
variant with exogenous technology (previous section) by setting the path of 
technology variable exogenously at the endogenous rates generated in the induced 
technology model. Note that this requires  / ˆ 0
B
R L Q g + =  to keep the energy share 
constant at the level in (24). 
We now disturb this steady state by a permanent, marginally small, reduction 
in the level of energy use and compare the change in output levels in both model 
variants. In both models, output falls on impact by  ( ) R q ¥  percent for each percent of 
reduction in energy use. In the exogenous technology model, a new steady state is 
immediately reached with a permanently higher energy share, with output levels 
( ) / R dR R q ¥ ×  percent lower, and with the growth rate the same as before the shock. 
In the induced technology model, technology levels adjust and the per capita growth 
rate temporarily deviates from its old level. In particular, the transitional growth rate 
will be higher (lower) if (27) is satisfied (violated). This change in growth during 
transition is exactly the additional impact of induced innovation. Hence, induced 
technological change induces higher long-run output levels than exogenous 
technology only if appropriability in energy-related innovation is relatively poor so 
that (27) is satisfied.  
 
 
4. Aggregate research in general equilibrium 
 
4.1. Modelling the capital and labour market 
So far we have analysed production only. We were able to analyse growth because we 
fixed total resources devoted to research.
9 By this assumption, the growth rate is 
supply-determined: the supply of energy R, labour L and research effort D determines 
growth.  In this section we investigate whether a change in the bias of technology that 
is induced by energy policies affects total innovation efforts (D) in the economy. That 
                                                 
9 This resembles the assumption in the older literature on induced technological change (e.g. Kennedy 
1964), which abstracted from the endogenous determination of total research expenditures.   20 
is, we address the question whether energy policies crowd out or crowd in aggregate 
R&D investment.  
  To study this, we extend the model by adding a trade-off between growth and 
current consumption to introduce the mechanisms familiar from endogenous growth 
models with one type of technical progress (e.g. Romer 1990). Research is undertaken 
by skilled workers, who can also choose to produce a consumption good
10 (CH) 
instead of doing research. One unit of skilled labour produces one unit of CH, which is 
sold under perfect competition. The total supply of skilled labour, H, is divided over 
research and production of CH, that is, CH =H-D. In equilibrium, skilled workers 
must be indifferent between working as researcher and producing the CH -good. 
Hence, the price of the CH -good equals the wage they earn in research, that is, pCH = 
wD.  
  The representative consumer maximizes intertemporal utility, specified as 
0 [ ln (1 )ln ]exp( ) H Y C C t dt
¥
a + -a -r ò , where CY and CH are two consumption goods 
and r is the utility discount rate.  The Cobb-Douglas utility specification implies that 
a fixed fraction of income, 1-a , is spent on CY-goods and a on CH-goods. In 
equilibrium, the quantities supplied are 
2 [1 (1 ) ] Y C Y = - -b  and  H C H D = -  
respectively
11, while the prices are 1 and wD. Goods market equilibrium therefore 
implies the following expression for the wage of skilled workers: 
 
 






æ ö - -
=ç ÷ - - è ø
a b
a
  (29) 
 
The cost of research efforts relative to output wD/Y , which was held constant above, 
is now endogenously determined: the ratio changes endogenously with the allocation 
of skilled labour over research and production. 
  The logarithmic form of the intertemporal utility function implies that the 
consumer chooses a consumption path along which total spending grows with the 
difference between the interest rate r and the rate of time preferencer: 
                                                 
10 This good can also be interpreted as an intermediate input in production of final goods. 
11 Total output Y is used for consumption and intermediate goods production. From (4), (8), (9) and 
(11), we find that total intermediate goods production equals 
2 (1 )
L L R R Q x Q x Y + = -b .   21 
ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) ( ) Y H CH C C p r -a +a + = -r. Substituting equilibrium prices and quantities 
2 [1 (1 ) ] Y C Y = - -b , CH = H-D, and pCH = wD, we can write the intertemporal 
consumption decision as: 
 






  (30) 
 
While (30) represents households’ supply of funds on the capital market, (21) 
represents firms’ demand for funds. We can characterise equilibrium in the capital 
market by combining (30) with the first equality of (21), substituting (26) to eliminate 
ˆ
L Q , and substituting (22) to eliminate  ˆ B Q . We choose to simplify expressions by 
setting 
2 (1 )/[1 (1 ) ] /(1 ) b -b - -b = a -a ; since we are not interested in comparative 
statics on b or a, this assumption is innocuous. We arrive at: 
 
  { } ˆ [ ( ) ]( ) L L R R
H D
D D H D
D
-
= r+z -z w - w -w q - .  (31) 
 
This differential equation reveals how total research effort (D), which was held 
constant above, changes over time in order to ensure that the rate of return that firms 
realize on their innovation efforts equal the rate of return that households require on 
their savings.  
Substituting (29) into (18) and (22), we find how the energy share changes 
over time when research costs and allocation are endogenous: 
 
  { } /
1 ˆ (1 ) [ ]( )( ) R R R R L L R NB R L H D g
-n æ ö q = - -q w x +w x - q -q + ç ÷ n è ø
  (32) 
 
The two differential equations in D and qR given by (31) and (32) characterize 
the dynamics of the model with endogenous technological change. Figure 4 depicts 
the associated phase portrait. Note that the  ˆ 0 D =  locus slopes up (down) if 
(, ) L R L R w > w w < w ; the  ˆ 0 R q =  locus slopes up (down) if  / / 0 ( 0) R L R L g g > < . An 
interior steady state exists if  / R L g  is not too large. The model is saddlepoint stable   22 
then. We solve for the long-run amount of research effort by setting (31) and (32) 
equal to zero. This gives: 
 
 
/ / [ ]( )
( )
1
L L R R L R R L H g
D
W -r z+ w x +w x w -w
¥ =
+W
  (33) 
 
where 0 ( )/( ) 1 L R L R L L R R < W º w w x +x w x +w x < . As is common in endogenous 
growth models, the equilibrium amount of R&D increases if the average productivity 
of research (z) increases, if the total supply of potential researchers (H) increases, or 
if the discount rate falls. The last term in the numerator shows that slower energy 
growth reduces R&D in the long run when appropriability in energy-related 
innovation is relatively weak ( L R w > w ). 
 
*** Insert about here: *** 
Figure 4 General-equilibrium dynamics of the energy share and total research effort 
with induced technological change  
 
The phase diagram shows that the energy share converges to a constant, as in 
the previous section. However, over time, total research effort may now change over 
time. In particular, the sign of the expression ( L R w -w ), which represents relative 
appropriability for the two types of research, uniquely determines whether research 
falls or rises during the transition to the steady state. If appropriability is better for 
labour-related technology than for energy-related technology,  L R w > w , the economy 
gradually allocates more skilled workers to research and development when the 
energy share in GDP falls. A lower energy share implies a smaller market for energy-
related innovations so that innovation shifts to labour-related markets. If 
appropriability is better in these markets, the overall marginal rate of return increases 
and total investment in R&D increases. We have no direct empirical evidence on 
differences in appropriability conditions across technologies. However, it is a well-
known stylised fact of post-war growth in the US that the fraction of the labour force 
allocated to R&D activities has steadily increased (cf. Jones, 1995). Although there 
are many alternative explanations for this development, in the present model it can be   23 
replicated by assuming  L R w > w . The stylised fact thus provides an argument to 
assume that appropriability is relatively poor in energy-related technologies.  
 
4.2. Energy conservation with induced technical change and endogenous growth  
First note that if  L R w = w , the total amount of research (D) is constant in equilibrium, 
so that the analysis of the previous section goes through. If   L R w > w , a reduction in 
the level of energy use increases the energy share and reduces research D along the 
saddlepath. In other words, energy conservation policy induces innovation in energy-
related technology, not only at the cost of a fall in labour-related innovation, but also 
at the cost of a fall in total research effort. Research activity is crowded out in the 
short run. Whether growth increases or decreases as a result of the policy depends on 
the combined effect of the scarcity effect, the induced innovation effect and the 
reduction in research effort. Applying a similar logic as used in the previous section, 
cf. Figure 3, we find that for an energy share that is far enough from its steady state 
level, the growth rate must rise. 
In the long run, a change in the level of energy use (at unchanged  / R L g ) does 
not affect the growth rate. However, a change in its growth rate  / R L g  leads to lower 
long-run growth, not only through the sources-of-growth effect as in the previous 
section, but now also by a decrease in research effort (see (28)). The interesting result 
is that even when total research increases by the policy shock, which requires the 
opposite case with  L R w < w , the long-run increase in research effort is never enough 
to completely offset the sources-of-growth effects. As a result, on balance the long-
run growth rate always falls. We see this by substituting (33) into (28) and 
differentiating with respect to  / R L g : we find  / / 0 R L dg dg >  for all admissible 
parameters. 
  Finally, it can be proven that energy conservation policies reduce long-run 
output levels, even when these policies induce higher growth and more research. It 
turns out that along the saddle path the growth of  L Q  always falls if  R q  increases. A 
reduction in the level of energy use increases the energy share and thus depresses the 
growth of  L Q . In the long run, the energy share converges to the pre-shock level, and 
less  L Q  has been accumulated. With higher  R q  and lower  L Q , Y/L is lower, see (16).  
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5. Summary of results and discussion 
 
We have developed a growth model in which growth is driven by steady growth of 
energy inputs and endogenous technological change. When considering the model 
dynamics for plausible parameters and initial conditions [ / 0 R L g > ,  L R w ³ w , 
(0) ( ) R R q > q ¥ ], we find an equilibrium path that is consistent with the main stylised 
facts: the energy share declines, energy efficiency improves, the energy price relative 
to wages declines, per capita income grows, and the number of researchers as a 
fraction of population grows. The growth rate of per capita income either 
monotonically falls or first falls and then slightly rises. 
The effects of energy conservation policies on aggregate economic growth 
have been studied within the model. We have distinguished between policies that 
reduce the level of energy use and those that reduce the growth rate of energy use. We 
have separated transitional effects from long-run effects. We have isolated the effects 
of exogenous technical change from those of endogenous changes in the direction of 
innovation, and those of endogenous changes in the rate of innovation.  
An important robust finding is that all energy conservation policies studied 
reduce per capita income levels. With induced technical change, the reduction in 
energy inputs is offset by faster improvements in energy-related technology, which 
may mitigate the drop in per capita income, but may never fully offset it. Thus, 
induced innovation cannot give rise to “win-win situations” in the spirit of Porter and 
Van der Linde (1995) – at least not within this model. In fact, the reverse result can be 
obtained in the model. Since non-energy-related R&D activities may be crowded out, 
and since even the total amount of research effort may fall, induced technical change 
not necessarily mitigates the long-run costs of energy conservation as compared to the 
case in which technological change comes for free as manna from heaven (cf. 
Smulders, 1998; 2000, for similar effects in the context of environmental policy). 
Another robust finding concerns long-run growth effects of energy 
conservation in the presence of induced technical change. In the long run, energy 
policies that reduce the growth rate of energy use always reduce long-run growth. A 
reduction in the level of energy use leaves long-run growth unaffected. These results   25 
sharply contrast with the case of exogenous technology, in which long-run growth is 
not affected.
12 
Following a reduction in the level of energy use, per capita growth is likely to 
accelerate. This is predicted to happen in the case of exogenous technical change, 
because of what we have labelled the “neoclassical scarcity effect”: increased scarcity 
of energy inputs implies a higher marginal product of energy and makes a given 
growth rate of energy supply contribute more to growth. In the case of induced 
technical change, the effect is reinforced by the shift in the direction of technological 
change toward energy efficiency improvements. Increased energy scarcity makes 
innovation more profitable and magnifies the effects of innovation.   
Appropriability of the returns to innovation plays an important role in the 
analysis. If appropriability in energy-related innovation is much worse than in other 
types of innovation and if the energy share is already close to its steady state level, 
then growth falls in response to energy conservation.  
We have focussed on the effects of growth rather than on welfare. A first 
reason why we stayed away from a welfare analysis is that this requires a careful 
modelling of the reasons for (and instruments of) energy conservation policies in the 
first place, which would make the model more complex. Obviously, if the external 
damage of energy burning is large enough, a small reduction in energy inputs always 
improves intertemporal welfare. Second, a welfare analysis is complex since several 
externalities play an important role in the model: monopoly pricing, intertemporal 
spillovers, and spillovers between firms distort production and innovation. Hence, 
energy policy is a second-best policy unless it is combined with the appropriate 
technology policy and product market regulations. An important form of technology 
policy in the model is providing subsidies to the type of research that suffers most 
from approprability problems. The optimal must act as an increase in parameter w, 
which has turned out to be an important determinant of how growth reacts to energy 
conservation policies. We expect that the energy conservation policies crucially 
depend on how they are combined with technology policies, a claim which is 
interesting to study in future work. 
   
                                                 
12 This result is due to the assumption that the elasticity of substitution is below unity. In case of a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, the long-run growth rate would fall with reduction in energy 
growth in the exogenous technology case, too.    26 
 
Appendix: derivation of the investment relation (20) 
The firm maximizes the net present value of profits subject to (8) and (19). The 
associated Hamiltonian reads: 
 
 
1 {[ (1 ) ] } [ ]
i i
ik Yi i ik ik ik ik ik D ik qik i i i ik H p S q x x q x w D p Q D D
-w w b -b = -b - - + x   (A.1) 
 
where the first term represent revenue (the term in parenthesis is the price), the second 
term represents production costs, and the third term represents development costs; pqik 
is the co-state variable of knowledge accumulation. The firm chooses output x, quality 
q and development effort D; it takes as given all variables not subscripted ik. Taking 
the first order condition with respect to output, we find the price-setting rule in (9). 





qik D ik i i i i p w D Q D
-w -w = wx   (A.2) 
 
The equation of motion for the co-state variable reads: 
 
  {[ (1 ) ] }
ik
Yi i ik ik ik qik qik
ik
H
p S x x x rp p
q
b -b ¶
= -b - = -
¶
   (A.3) 
 
We find (20) from (A.3) after dividing by pqik, substituting (9) as well as (the time 
derivative of) (A.2). 
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Appendix B: proof that per capita income falls with energy use  
Consider a permanent reduction in R (without a change in subsequent growth rate of 
R, i.e.  / R L g  remains constant) in the model with endogenous direction and rate of 
technical change (section 4). In this appendix we proof that this shock unambiguously 
lowers output levels Y/L, even when the shock triggers more innovation. 
Per capita income is determined by  R q  and  L Q  only, see (16). In the long run, 
R q  is not affected by the change in R, see (24). Hence, to find the effect on Y/L, we 
need to know how  L Q  is affected. We will show that its growth rate  ˆ
L Q  is 
unambiguously reduced by the shock so that the long-run level is lower. 
From (26), (22) and (29), we solve for  ˆ
L Q  in terms of  R q  and D.  
 
ˆ [ ( )( )] L R R NB
R
Q D H D
z




Noting that D depends on  R q  since the equilibrium moves along the 
saddlepath (cf. Figure 5), we can derive: 
 
ˆ
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Our claim is that the sign of this expression is negative. Note that  0 H D - ³  because 





 is ambiguous. We may 
distinguish between four cases: 
1.  0 R R NB x +q -q >  and  L R w > w  so that  / 0 R D ¶ ¶q < ; 
2.  0 R R NB x +q -q <  and  L R w < w  so that  / 0 R D ¶ ¶q > ; 
3.  0 R R NB x +q -q >  and  L R w < w  so that  / 0 R D ¶ ¶q > ; 
4.  0 R R NB x +q -q <  and  L R w > w  so that  / 0 R D ¶ ¶q < ; 
In case 1 and 2 the expression in (B.1) is negative, but cases 3 and 4 need further 
analysis. In particular, we need to know more about the exact magnitude of  / R D ¶ ¶q . 
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so that  ˆ / 0 L R Q ¶ ¶q <  along the  0 D =   locus. However, what is relevant is the 
movement along the saddlepath rather than along the  0 D =   locus. Hence the 
expression in (B.2) overestimates  / R D ¶ ¶q  if the saddlepath lies above the  0 D =   
locus (cf. Figure 5). This is the case if  L R w > w . The necessary downward adjustment 




 find  / R D ¶ ¶q  along the saddlepath, D  
 
the change in D We have to adjust the change in In case 3f  
(Note that a change in R affects  R q  according to (18) at the time of the shock. 
Subsequently,  R q  moves along the saddlepath of the Phase diagram in Figure 5 and 
converges to its pre-shock . 
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Table 1  
Annual average growth rates of labour and energy inputs and output (percentages). 
 
          1960-69  1970-79  1980-90 
 
Energy input
a  US      4.03    1.71    1.04 
    Japan      10.69    3.35    1.94 
    France     5.97    2.58    1.37 
    West Germany  3.73    2.69    -0.18 
    UK      3.27    0.48    0.76 
 
Labour input
b  US      1.58    2.06    1.02 
    Japan      1.57    0.82    0.72 
    France     0.84    0.81    0.86 
    West Germany  0.25    -0.06    1.20 
    UK      0.49    0.47    0.47 
 
Output
c  US      3.86    2.81    2.37 
    Japan      9.07    3.94    3.72 
    France     5.06    2.92    1.99 
    West Germany  3.92    2.44    1.92 
    UK      2.50    2.12    2.56 
 
a.  Energy use in tons of oil equivalent. Calculated from the International Sectoral 
Database (OECD, 1999), and the OECD energy balances. Following the 
approach outlined in De Nooij et al. (2001), we used the sectoral data to 
include the transformation losses and the deliveries of the electricity sector to 
other sectors in the macro-economic energy use.  
b.  Employment in persons, calculated from the Penn World Tables (Summers 
and Heston, 1991, mark 5.6) 
c.  Real GDP, calculated from the Penn World Tables. 
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Figure legends 
 
Figure 1 Energy input per worker (energy use in 1000 tons of oil equivalent per 
worker). Data source: see table 1. 
 
Figure 2 Energy efficiency (GDP per ton of oil equivalent). Data source: see table 1. 
 
Figure 3 Partial-equilibrium dynamics of the energy share and output growth with 
induced technical change 
 
Figure 4 General-equilibrium dynamics of the energy share and total research effort 
with induced technological change 
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Figure 1  
Energy input per worker (energy use in 1000 tons of oil equivalent per worker). Data 
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Figure 3 Partial-equilibrium dynamics of the energy share and output growth with 
induced technical change 
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Figure 5   4 
Figure 4 General-equilibrium dynamics of the energy share and total research effort 
with induced technological change 
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